Assorted WW2 Discussion

[Lu Xun]

7 hours ago, Shiho Nishizumi said:

*Edit.* Mod gave a general verbal for off topic shortly after I posted this, so keep that in mind when you read this Inst.

Japan's tank prowess was sufficient for what they had intended it to be; conflicts with either nations that possessed little to no tanks (such as China), or in terrains where their specifications worked to their advantage (such as the invasion of the European colonies). Due to the scarcity of steel (made worse by the embargoes) alongside the priority given to the IJN for whatever there indeed was, to hold Japan to the Soviet Union standards, who went the polar opposite route and built a metric frick ton of tanks, is simply an unrealistic expectation. Just like it'd be unreasonable to hold the Soviet Union to Japanese standards in regards to navy building, particularly on the surface fleet aspect. It'd also be akin to looking at how many Essex the U.S. built, and going like "well, clearly anyone else is a third world shithole if they don't match our naval output".

The lack of anti-tank measures hurt the IJA badly, yes. And honestly, they have no real excuse for lacking them. And it was indeed made worse with the rapid advances on armor during the war, which the Japanese weren't unable to keep up with. However, I think that you are holding the IJA to the standards and metrics of an European army fighting in Europe, which, no. SEA was a far more underdeveloped and both the climate and terrain were plenty harsher, and limited the extent to which armor could be effectively employed. Hell, you can find reports from the Americans during the Korean War (this is mainland Asia ftr) where one of the rationales for preferring the Jackson over the Pershing as an up-gun for the Shermans was the weight, and ease of transportation that comes with it. Same thing with the French and their preference for the Jackson over their captured and refurbished Panthers in Indochina. Though for them, the larger caliber and therefore more effective high explosive fire support was likely also another reason.

Also, considering that basically everyone, bar the Germans and Soviets, had the WW1 mentality in 1939, and the Soviets were busy both killing their talented officer core, and refilling them with inexperienced if not incompetent replacements as a result of their simultaneous expansion, well... Let's just say that while I agree that the SU's capabilities are underappreciated in the West, and unfairly so (I very much agree with that), you've been going the direct opposite route this entire thread.

*Edit.*

Wait... You're seriously saying that the Japanese sucked because the Kwantung army, one that had been weakened throughout the years due to being a reinforcement pool for forces in other theaters of the war and due to the blockade, got crushed (which it did) by the Soviets in 1945, who had spent months bringing their European theater battle hardened troops and equipment which technologically leapfrogged whatever the Japanese had in mainland Asia.

...

Yes, that was the only possible outcome of that whole set of operations. Not unlike Tsushima 40 years earlier. Both were spectacular victories, but were never destined to be anything but. 

>Second rate forces.

>Caught the European countries unaware.

Mate, the British had been expecting the Japanese for a while by then. What came as a surprise on the outset was that the Japanese simultaneously attacked all of the Allied naval assets within distance, and not just Pearl Harbor. They bombed Hawaii as they made their push south. They were definitely not second rate forces ( if they are, then rip the French armed forces, Italian land army, Soviet Red Navy, etc) and had plenty enough momentum by themselves. Said momentum was simply bound to be lost if victory wasn't secured in a short timespan (which it never would've been), and that was something that not only Yamamoto, but basically anyone who had been to the U.S. and seen its industrial facilities, predicted would've happened.

 

As you can see from other posts, I'm pushing back on the myth of Axis military competence. On the level of tactics and sometimes equipment, yes, but on the level of operational and strategic art, no.

 

When it came to the IJA and IJN, its primary strengths came to fighting spirit, which was also its weakness in that it made both political blunders and destabilized the Japanese civilian government so that it entered wars that were plain suicide. And that fighting spirit isn't exactly unique in East Asia, although its ubiquity is. The Chinese, for instance, went to suicide bombing relatively quickly in the Second Sino-Japanese War with soldiers strapping grenades and suicide bombing Japanese forces. The German-trained 88th went quickly to charging Japanese tanks with satchel charges. The Chinese in Taierzhuang did the Roman Lucretia one better by having their rape survivors mount satchel charges and charge Japanese tanks. The Vietnamese in the Third Indochina War / First (Modern) Sino-Vietnamese War were famous for an incident wherein a mother threw her baby alongside a satchel charge at a Chinese AFV. The Wu forces under Goujian, thousands of years ago, began battles by having their front line commit suicide. The British during the Opium Wars were horrified to find that, upon successfully storming a Manchu garrison, the Manchu soldiers committed mass suicide to avoid capture.

When it came to material factors, as well as coordination, Western observers during the Battle of Shanghai, for instance, noted that the IJA poorly coordinated artillery fire on defending KMT troops. The Arisaka rifle, as well, was considered one of the worst rifles of WW2. And if you look up Carlson's Patrol, innovations such as heavier firepower and USMC fireteams savaged retreating Japanese forces in Guadalcanal.

 

When we look at the Soviet Manchurian operation, the crucial factor was that, first, Manchukuo at the end of WW2 had more industrial capability than the Japanese Home Islands due to the relative scarcity of strategic bombing against Manchukuo, and that Manchukuo had considerable iron resources. Second, in only a span of about 3 weeks, the Soviets ran over the Japanese client states and their Japanese garrisons in the region. Third, Manchukuo WAS tank country, given that the Jurchens / Manchus who were indigenous to the region tended to operate heavy cavalry and mounted archers in the pre-modern era. And for that matter, Japan proper was tankable, given that Yamato's descent onto Honshu involved their cavalry advantage against Japanese aborigines, and that as late as the Japanese Warring States period, legendary units included Takeda Heavy Cavalry.